Feb 16—Russian Navy’s Project 22160 Patrol Vessel Dmitriy Rogachev 375 sails through the Bosphorus … [+]
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Turkey’s balancing act between Russia and NATO is falling flat. Turkey enjoys a strong relationship with both of its maritime neighbors. Russia and Ukraine together are Turkey’s biggest grain suppliers. Russia is Turkey’s primary energy supplier. Turkey employs a Russian-made air defense system, angering NATO members. Meanwhile, Turkey has upset Moscow by supplying Ukraine with armed drones. Turkey has called for Russian hostilities to cease, but it abstained from a February 25 vote on suspending Russia’s membership in most bodies of the Council of Europe. On Monday, under pressure from Ukraine, Turkey implemented an international law that enabled it to block Russian warships from entering the Black Sea. While the U.S. has welcomed this move, Turkey’s reasoning behind it may ignite tensions in the long term. Turkey must clarify and change its rationale for blocking Russian warships to avoid escalating the conflict.
On Monday, February 28, Turkey invoked the Montreux Convention of 1936, which was designed to keep the peace in the Black Sea. The Straits of Bosporus and the Dardanelles are Turkish internal waters that connect the Black Sea and the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas. In the 19th and 20th Centuries, disputes repeatedly developed as world powers—especially Turkey, Russia, and their predecessor countries and empires—attempted to restrict warships from passing through these strategic chokepoints. The 1936 Montreux Convention was designed to balance Turkey’s rights over its internal waters with the international community’s rights and needs to use the straits and to keep the peace in the Black Sea. (The Montreaux Convention applies to the straits, and not the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), because it is a specialized law related to a specific area that was in force before the adoption of UNCLOS).
The Montreux Convention gives Turkey the right to restrict access to the states by warships of non-Black Sea states. In peacetime, Turkey may limit the size of vessels that may enter the Straits, impose notification requirements on warships in the straits, and restrict the warships of non-Black Sea states from remaining in the sea for more than 21 days. In wartime, Turkey must restrict access to the Black Sea for belligerent powers, allowing them to enter the Sea only return to their home ports. Turkey can also restrict access when Turkey “considers herself to be threatened with imminent danger of war.” Turkey has rigorously applied the Convention during peacetime. It has invoked it during wartime only once, in World War II, when it closed the straits to belligerents.
Ukraine put Turkey on the spot by publicly asking it to close the straits. By the time Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 16 Russian warships and a submarine had already entered the straits during military exercises preceding the war. The Black Sea was the site of early fighting on Snake Island and Russia’s incursions into Odessa. On February 25, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy asked Turkey to close the straits to Russian warships. Zelenskyy then thanked Turkey for deciding to close the straits to Russian warships on Twitter, reportedly forcing Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan to make a decision. Within a day, Turkey called the conflict a “war,” essentially forcing itself to block the straits to belligerents. But on Monday, February 28, Turkey announced that it would close the strait to all warships, not just belligerent ones. Turkey made clear that warships would only be allowed to enter if returning to their home port.
The closure will do little to stop fighting in the short term. Russian warships currently in the Black Sea will be able to sustain themselves for two to three months without returning to their home ports, especially with the ability to replenish in Crimea. However, if the war wages on, warships that exit the Black Sea will be unable to return. Reportedly, four Russian warships canceled their plans to enter the Black Sea as a result of Turkey’s announcement.
Turkey’s balancing act could easily fall flat. Turkey could have easily blocked only belligerent—or Russian ships. It likely chose to block all warships to avoid the appearance of taking sides against Russia. Turkey has advanced no rationale for feeling that it is in “imminent” danger of war that would allow it to block all warships from entering the straits. A NATO member’s essential announcement that it is “threatened with imminent danger of war,” could have consequences for the Alliance’s involvement in the conflict—especially if Russia chooses to press this point or use it to escalate. If Turkey is not at imminent danger of war, a neutral state could ostensibly sue it for blocking its navigational rights in the straits. Every neutral state will not give up its navigational rights to two of the world’s most strategic straits, especially if the war drags on.
Moreover, Turkey’s blocking the straits is only as good as its enforcement. So far, no Russian or Ukrainian ships have asked to enter the Black Sea during the conflict. If a Russian ship tries to enter, Turkey has now committed to blocking it. Doing so could escalation tensions with Russia, and in turn, between Russia and NATO. Meanwhile, if non-belligerent nations wish to position warships in the Black Sea—including NATO countries—Turkey’s position is that it will block them as well. To do so could inflame tensions between NATO and Turkey; not to do so could escalate conflict by showing that Turkey is taking a position against Russia. Allowing non-belligerent warships to pass would show that Turkey is unable or unwilling to police the straits—which would damage both Turkey’s reputation and possibly the future of a Convention that entrusts Turkey to keep the peace in the Black Sea.
Turkey would be wise to clarify its legal rationale for blocking access to the straits and block only belligerent warships from entering. Turkey’s NATO allies should press it to do so to avoid further escalation of the conflict. NATO should also want to avoid a long-term precedent that would allow Turkey to assert broader control over the straits than the Convention allows. The fate of the Convention itself may be at risk. Erdogan has already made noises about circumventing the Convention to implement an ambitious canal project. NATO should act to preserve the instrument that has kept peace in the Black Sea for nearly a century—before it becomes a casualty of war.
